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That project, however, left me more than a few decades short of the
cases I had set out to understand. In its writing, I also discovered there
were other stories to be told or retold, one of which was an account of the
connections between Indian reserves and Native fisheries, the subject of
two of the Supreme Court decisions from 1996: R. v. Nikal and R. v. Lewis.
These cases, and the historical record that they opened for me, led me to
believe that Canada’s regulation of the fisheries in British Columbia could
be more fully understood in the context of the process of Indian reserve
allotments. Similarly, the emergence of an Indian reserve geography could
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Introduction

On 21 October 1925, Domanic Charlie swung his gaff hook into the
Capilano River where it runs through Squamish Indian Reserve No. 5
Capilano. The river was low after a dry summer, but with the fall rains the
chum salmon, which had been schooling near its mouth, began to move
into the river to spawn. With the gaff – a detachable iron hook with a
connecting line at the end of a long pole – Charlie impaled a salmon and
pulled it from the river. He hooked a second and hauled it ashore as well.
Nearly forty years old, Charlie was a Squamish hereditary chief who
held the name of See-qawl-tuhn. He had been born on the south shore
of English Bay and spent his life working in the local lumber industry,
running log booms on the Serpentine River near the Canada-United States
border with his half-brother, August Jack Khahtsahlano, and then on the
Squamish River. In a pattern common for many Native people in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Charlie supplemented his wage
work in the industrial resource economy by recourse to a traditional
economy, including the harvesting of fish. In years when paid employment
was scarce, the obverse might be true: sporadic work in the wage economy
supplemented a livelihood largely derived from traditional patterns of resource procurement. In the emerging economy built over Charlie’s lifetime around seasonal and cyclical resource extraction industries (fisheries,
forestry, mining) and agriculture, elements of a more traditional economy
provided an important source of food and, in some cases, income for many
Native people.1
The Squamish are a Coast Salish people who claim as their traditional
territory the ocean and the land surrounding what is now English Bay,
Burrard Inlet, and Howe Sound, as well as the drainage basins of the
Squamish and Cheakamus rivers (Figure 0.1). Their village sites looked
out over these bodies of water, and, as was the case for other Coast Salish
peoples, some of whom shared these spaces, their traditional cultures and
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economies were built around marine plants and animals, particularly fish.2
The Capilano reserve includes one of those village sites. Allotted in the
early 1860s, the reserve surrounds the last stretches of the Capilano River
as it flows through a small flood plain and delta before emptying into the
Pacific Ocean at the narrows to the inlet that forms the port of Vancouver.
Identified in 1916 in the report of the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs
for the Province of British Columbia as a “village site and fishing station,”
the Capilano reserve had been the first of more than twenty reserves allotted
to the Squamish. These reserves provided the Squamish – about 400 community members in 1916 – a small land base in their traditional territory.
The Squamish had fished their traditional territory before newcomers,
primarily of European and Asian descent, began to settle on the shores
around Burrard Inlet in the mid-nineteenth century. This history of prior
use could be understood as one of the sources of Charlie’s right to fish in
the Capilano River; he was exercising a Native or Aboriginal right to fish.3
Canada’s Department of Marine and Fisheries (Fisheries) located the legal
basis of the Squamish fishery elsewhere. So far as the department was concerned, Charlie was fishing under an Indian food fishing permit that it had
issued pursuant to the Fisheries Act. This permit allowed its holder to fish
for food at times, in places, and with particular technologies that were
closed to other fishers. However, the department imposed limits on the
food fishery, and at the beginning of 1925 it had closed the Capilano to all
fishing except angling in order to protect what it considered an important
sport-fishing river. The Capilano was renowned for its steelhead, a seagoing trout and a favourite of sport fishers. Given its proximity to the
growing city of Vancouver, the river was heavily fished. Some had advocated turning the river over to an angling club.4 That had not happened,
but in 1925 Fisheries increased its surveillance of the Native fisheries on
the river. In October, the recently appointed Fisheries officer, Austin Spencer, an angler himself, watched Charlie pull the two chum salmon from the
water. Later that day he charged Charlie under the Fisheries Act with catching fish in the Capilano River “by means other than angling.”
The case of Rex v. Charlie appeared on the docket in the local police
court the next week. Several weeks later, in a reserved judgment, the magistrate acquitted Charlie. The Department of Fisheries had not made out
its case against him, and, more importantly as general precedent, the magistrate ruled that the department had no jurisdiction to regulate Indians
fishing on Indian reserves. That responsibility lay with Canada’s Department of Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs). Fisheries hired a senior lawyer, appealed to the county court, and within a month had its conviction. Although
Indians held the exclusive right to fish on their reserves, the judge ruled
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Figure 0.1 Squamish Indian reserves, 1925. The inset map shows the location
of the reserves in relation to the area that the Squamish claim as their traditional
territory. | Source: The boundaries of the traditional territory are based on maps submitted to and approved by the British Columbia Treaty Commission as the basis for
treaty negotiation. (These maps are available at http://www.bctreaty.net/nations/soi_
maps/Squamish_01_SOI_Map.pdf)
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that Fisheries could regulate the Indian food fishery, even to the point of
eliminating it to enhance a sport fishery. He fined Charlie one dollar. The
Squamish wished to appeal, but Indian Affairs, which had also hired a senior lawyer for the appeal, had sparred long enough with its fellow department in the British Columbia courts. It refused to pursue the case or to
release money it held in trust for the Squamish so that they could hire a
lawyer to pursue it. The conviction stood. Charlie could not fish on the
Capilano reserve, a reserve that had been allotted to the Squamish as a “village site and fishing station,” unless he used a sport fisher’s hook and line.
Charlie, a case that I return to in more detail in Chapter 6, marks the
culminating effects of the processes examined in this book. By 1925, the
governments of Canada and British Columbia had imposed on the Native
peoples of the province an Indian reserve geography that presumed access
to the fisheries. Over the same period, Canada had also constructed a legal
regime governing the fisheries that, for the most part, opened them to all
comers. An increasingly restricted and uncertain Indian food fishery was
the only remnant of Native peoples’ prior claim to the fish. These two legal
constructs – the Indian reserve and the Indian food fishery – were two of
the principal instruments of state power and colonial control in British
Columbia. Although nested in two quite different legal regimes – one governing land use and structured around notions of private property, the
other governing fisheries and premised primarily on the resource as common property – the reserve and the food fishery served the same purpose.
Their intent and effect were to set aside fragments of traditional territories
and fisheries for Native peoples, opening the remainder to immigrants. In
short, the reserves and food fisheries were the colonial state’s pinched
concessions to the prior rights of Native peoples. Constructed together
and operating in tandem, these legal categories consigned Native peoples
to small parcels of land with inadequate protection for the fisheries that
were to be their primary means of support. The story, then, is one of dispossession, a dispossession characterized by the colonial state’s failure to
honour its limited attempts to provide space for Native peoples and their
livelihoods.
The connections between Indian reserves, Native fisheries, and AngloCanadian law in British Columbia need to be understood not only to explain the Indian reserve geography that remains largely intact today, but
also to understand the impact on Native peoples of Canada’s regulation of
the fisheries. Although they are the subject of legal proceedings that have
reached the Supreme Court of Canada, these connections have not been
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sufficiently explored or understood by the courts,5 by scholars focusing on
colonial land policy,6 or by those writing on the fisheries.7 The fisheries
were absolutely central to the allotment of Indian reserves in British Columbia. Chronicling the connections between reserved land and the fisheries, and describing the legal regime that severed them, reallocating the
fisheries to others, is the principal contribution of this book. Providing an
understanding of the Indian food fishery – to the fisheries what the Indian
reserve is to land – is another. These objectives are important not only for
what they reveal about Indian land policy and the regulation of the fisheries in British Columbia, but also because the fisheries remain one of the
principal sites of conflict between Native peoples and the state. Understanding the history of this conflict is central to its resolution.
The history of colonial land policy in British Columbia is now relatively
clear. In Making Native Space, historical geographer Cole Harris has described the process of separating Native from non-Native land in the colony
and province.8 The provincial government’s refusal to recognize Native
title or to enter into treaties – with the exception of the Douglas Treaties
on Vancouver Island in the 1850s – distinguished the construction of an
Indian reserve geography in British Columbia from that of its neighbours
to the east (the North-West Territories governed by Canada) and to the
south (the Washington Territory of the United States).9 The province had
nothing to do with the negotiation of Treaty 8, one of a series known as
the numbered treaties, that included the northeast corner of British Columbia. Over the vast majority of territory, immigrants settled on land for
which Native title had not been ceded, a policy whose consequences reverberate today in a modern treaty process, in litigation over Aboriginal title,10
and in negotiations over the government’s responsibility to Native peoples
when dealing with unceded or non-treaty land.11
Aside from the refusal to acknowledge title, Native land policies in British Columbia were also distinctive. Instead of detaching Native peoples
from their traditional territories and placing them on large centralized reserves (a common pattern in the United States) or providing several substantial reserves within traditional territories (as was the pattern in much of
Canada), the Dominion and provincial governments undertook a joint process in British Columbia that resulted in the allotment of many small reserves. They provided Native peoples with points of attachment within
their traditional territories, but little more. In the 1920s, when the reserve
allotment process came to an end, the acreage set aside as Indian reserve
amounted to slightly more than one-third of one percent of the land area
in the province.12 As Harris has argued, echoing the voices of many Native
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peoples, the amount of reserved land was too small and its quality too poor
to enable them to maintain viable economies in their traditional territories.
To the extent that Dominion and provincial officials sought to justify the
unusually small reserve acreage in British Columbia, they did so on the
grounds that Native peoples on the Pacific coast were primarily fishing
peoples who did not need a large land base. Some agricultural and grazing
land would be set aside as reserve, most of it marginal and often without
sufficient water rights, but there was little enough viable farmland in the
province, and immigrants would occupy most of it. Access to the fisheries
was the principal basis on which government officials explained the land
policy and on which Indian reserve commissioners allotted Indian reserves.
To take one example from many, Indian Reserve Commissioner Peter
O’Reilly described the Tlatlasikwala (Nahwitti) Reserve No. 1 Hope Island, at the northern tip of Vancouver Island, as “utterly worthless except
as affording sheltered points from which the Indians can, weather permitting, start on their fishing expeditions.”13 In many parts of the province,
the control of land – as a place to set a net or drag it ashore, as a rock from
which to work a dip net, as a point of departure or return from fishing
expeditions, or as a place to process fish – secured control of a fishery. This
would change in the twentieth century as the widespread dissemination of
gasoline-powered boats, refrigeration, and other technological changes created a much more mobile fishing fleet, but when Canada and British Columbia constructed an Indian reserve geography, the land/fish nexus
mattered. Control of local fisheries provided a means, often the only means,
of living on the land.
Government officials were right about the importance of the fisheries to
Native peoples along the coast and through much of the interior. The Pacific Ocean provided an enormous abundance and diversity of plant and
animal life that sustained large, geographically established, wealthy, and
frequently hierarchical societies. Similarly, the river systems of the interior,
which bore some of the world’s largest salmon runs, were the oceanic tendrils along which Native societies and economies flourished. Lives were
lived in seasonal cycles that included movement between a number of resource procurement and ceremonial sites, but most Native peoples in British Columbia were not hunter/gatherers as anthropologists have come to
understand the designation. Instead, they were specialists in the harvesting
and processing of fish, primarily salmon. Several scholars have written well
about Native peoples’ use and management of the fisheries along the Pacific coast of North America and the rivers that run to it, and I do not
intend to add to that literature here.14 Nevertheless, these were the condi-
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tions that led government officials to emphasize the importance of the
fisheries and to discount the need for a large land base when they explained
their land policy and justified the particular, and meagre, Indian reserve
geography in British Columbia.
The characterization of Native peoples in British Columbia as fishing
peoples, while largely accurate, was not neutral. The act of fishing was
filled with cultural meaning in British society, a meaning that varied considerably depending on who was fishing and for what reasons. Fishing for
pleasure was a guarded prerogative of the landed gentry in Britain, guarded
not only to protect stocks but also to prevent the vices of idleness and
indolence that the upper classes associated with fishing among the lower.
Subsistence fishing was thought an activity of the mean and destitute, while
commercial fishing deflected attention that was more appropriately engaged
on the land.15 A variant of this sentiment is captured in the writing of A.C.
Anderson, a Hudson’s Bay Company trader from 1832 to 1858 and later
Canada’s first inspector of fisheries in British Columbia and appointee to
the Joint Indian Reserve Commission, who described the fishing peoples
of the northwest coast of North America as follows: “Procuring an abundant livelihood with little exertion; gross, sensual, and for the most part
cowardly – the races who depend entirely, or chiefly, on fishing, are immeasurably inferior to those tribes, who, with nerves and sinews braced by
exercise, and minds comparatively ennobled by frequent excitement, live
constantly amid war and the chase.”16 A little more than a decade later,
Anderson was one of the early defenders of the Native fisheries, but his
sense that fishing produced undesirable social consequences reflected broad
cultural assumptions. They help to explain various efforts to deflect Native
peoples from their fisheries and towards an agrarian economy. But the desire to leave what little agricultural land there was for incoming settlers,
and the attachment of Native peoples to their fisheries, produced an Indian
reserve geography based around the fisheries.
The maps in the Appendix reveal the locations of nearly 750 reserves
across British Columbia that were identified specifically for their importance in the catching or processing of fish.17 They show a particularly strong
connection between reserved land and fisheries along the west coast of
Vancouver Island and along the mainland coast to the Alaskan panhandle.
In these areas, most of the reserves were intended as fishing stations that
would provide access to a variety of fish, including salmon, halibut, herring,
dogfish, cod, and oolichan, as well as clam beds and sea mammals, primarily seal. The single most productive fisheries, however, were in the interior at particular locations along the Fraser, Skeena, and Nass rivers. The
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anadromous Pacific salmon – primarily sockeye but also chinook, coho,
chum, and pink – as well as locally important trout fisheries supported an
extensive Native population with food and valuable trade commodities. As
a result, many of the reserves in the interior were allotted to secure access
to these resources. For both coast and interior, the maps represent a landbased human geography of the fisheries.18
Many more reserves could easily have been included on the maps. They
show only those reserves that were expressly allotted by one of the reserve
commissions for fishing purposes or for the processing of fish. Some reserves, including a few crucially important fishing sites, are not included
because the reserve commissioners overlooked the importance of the fishery in allotting the reserve or did not record it. In some cases, the reserve
was a village site, and this use is noted rather than the fishery. In other
cases, the commissioners allotted land for wood or timber but did not
mention that the wood might be used in smokehouses or to build fish
boats and canoes. Finally, for a great many reserves the commissioners recorded fishing as one among several occupations of the residents but did
not connect the reserve itself to a fishery. These reserves are not on the
maps, not because the fisheries were unimportant, but because there is no
indication in the reserve commissions’ records that the reserve itself was
allotted to secure access to a fishery. Indirectly, however, by providing a
place to live and possibly a means of support during the off-season, these
reserves also supported a fishery. In short, most reserves were set aside to
secure Native fisheries. Land followed fish.
However, beginning in the 1870s, and coinciding with the rapid emergence of a canning industry, Canada’s Department of Fisheries undertook
to unravel the connection between land and fish. It sought to ensure that
any proprietary interest held by Native peoples in their reserves remained
on dry land; the exclusive rights that characterized the occupation of land,
Fisheries maintained, did not extend to the fisheries. In fact, the Department of Fisheries based its opposition to the recognition of Native fishing
rights on the grounds that while land, including Indian reserve land, might
be held as private property, the fisheries were common property. The idea
that fisheries were common property, which Dutch legal theorist Hugo
Grotius gave voice to in international law and which the English common
law gave expression to in the doctrine of the public right to fish, marks a
fundamental difference between the law that applied to the land and that
operating over water. Understanding these legal regimes and the differential extension of state sovereignty over land and water is crucial to understanding the processes of dispossession in British Columbia.
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Sovereignty and Property – Land and Fisheries
Conflict over territory lies at the heart of colonialism.19 This is most evident in settler colonies, such as British Columbia, where immigrants arrived with aspirations to build new lives and stay. Their settlement depended
on the opening of territory that they could physically occupy and legally
possess, and it was the function of the colonial state to open it. In some
cases, negotiation and agreement with indigenous peoples underwrote the
resettlement of territory by an immigrant population; in others it was military power and its violence that made the land available. In most places,
these strategies of dispossession coexisted. In a mid-nineteenth-century
colonial undertaking, such as British Columbia, military power lay in the
past and in the background; its threat rather than its exercise was generally
sufficient to prevent uprisings. So too the cultural assumptions of progress,
superiority, and civilization buttressed the colonial state. But a growing
literature highlights the importance of European law in the extension of
imperial power overseas, both as a means of establishing control and as a
justification for it.20 State law established order, displacing its opposite,
anarchy, and was a pivotal marker of progress, or so many assumed. In fact,
the colonial theatre was a site of plural legal orders, indigenous, imposed,
and hybrid, that coexisted, although not on equal terms. Where separate
and formally recognized systems of customary law emerged, as in much of
Africa and Asia, European law remained paramount in instances of conflict. In settler colonies, where the primary object was settlement of an
immigrant population, colonial states did not construct separate legal systems. Instead, the salience of indigenous legal traditions withered as the
balance of power shifted towards the immigrant society, the colonial state,
and its legal structures.
Land
The opening of space to immigrant settlement involved two interrelated
and concurrent processes that also defined the emergence of nation-states
in Europe: the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory, and the consolidation of control within it. The acquisition of sovereignty involved establishing and defending a territorial claim within which the state held supreme
law-making authority. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which established
a temporary reprieve from decades of conflict in Europe, is widely considered the moment when emerging nation-states established the principle
that each was sovereign.21 The basis of political authority had shifted away
from a set of personal relationships between the sovereign and subject, and
towards a notion of exclusive jurisdiction within defined territories.22
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The consolidation of control within sovereign territory was part of a
process that confirmed state sovereignty and was also an exercise of that
sovereignty. Anthropologist James Scott describes the emerging state as
the locus of centralized power in post-Enlightenment Europe, a development that, he argues, paralleled the efforts of these new political entities to
reduce the complexities that characterized the customary rights and communal uses of feudal land tenure. Understood locally, the rights of land use
in feudal society were inseparable from their context and opaque at a distance. A decisive moment in the emergence of the modern state, Scott
suggests, was the simplification of land tenure, a process that enabled the
central classification of land and, in turn, the extension of state power.23
The state consolidated its sovereignty through the extension of its law of
property.
The marginalization of custom was gradual and never complete. E.P.
Thompson’s marvellous studies of eighteenth-century rural England reveal a society riven by customary claims on the one hand, and rights based
in the common law and statute on the other.24 Custom did not disappear
entirely – it remained a source of particular laws and, at another level, of
the common law itself – but it had become subject to the jurisdiction of the
common law and subordinated to it. As the diversity and salience of customary claims disappeared, the land was filled with a law of property that
could be known at a national level. Legal texts such as Littleton’s Tenures
in the fifteenth century, Sir Edward Coke’s Institutes of the Law of England
in the sixteenth, and Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England in the eighteenth made that law known.25
In a regime of private property, the owner’s principal claim is to a right
to exclude others from occupying, possessing, or otherwise using the thing
claimed.26 It is this “idea of ownership,” suggests legal theorist Jeremy
Waldron, that is the “organizing idea” of private property.27 Blackstone
famously described the right to private property as “that sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”28 By the nineteenth century, this “ownership model,” to borrow Joseph Singer’s characterization,29 had become the pervasive understanding of property in Britain and its settler colonies. The onus lay on
non-owners to justify interfering with the right to exclusive possession.
This had not always been the case, but by the mid-nineteenth century,
private property was hegemonic, at least when people thought of land.
Common property, characterized not by the right to exclude but by its
opposite – the right not to be excluded – was consigned a secondary role in
relation to land.30
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The assertion of sovereignty and the imposition of a regime of private
property occurred in British colonies overseas, albeit more suddenly and
completely. In those colonies where colonization – the settlement of immigrant populations – was the principal imperial objective, the appropriation
of territory and its reorganization assumed a particular urgency.31 Here the
doctrine of discovery was important in the European effort to establish
spheres of sovereignty; imperial states that “discovered” a territory were
entitled to take possession of it to the exclusion of other imperial powers –
they were sovereign.32 Sovereignty could also be acquired through treaty
or war, and even by the act of settlement itself. In western North America,
the Oregon Treaty of 1846 resolved the competing claims of Great Britain
and the United States by dividing their interests along the forty-ninth parallel.33 This treaty, dividing territory between imperial powers, would lead
to the construction of a colonial state in British Columbia. It was part of
the extension of imperial power, a process that historical geographer Daniel
Clayton, in his study of the cartographic and geopolitical processes that
placed Vancouver Island in a corner of the British imperial imaginary, has
described as the “loss of locality.”34 The spaces of indigenous peoples became territorial possessions within empires. This was the legal scaffolding
that would facilitate the emergence of a colonial state and, with it, a settler
society.
Initially, the imperial state sought to interpose itself between indigenous
peoples and settlers by acquiring land from its indigenous inhabitants –
sometimes through purchase and treaty but at other times by war. The
effect in law was to sweep away the complexity and, from the state’s perspective, clutter of pre-existing customary rights and to create space devoid
of legally recognizable tenure. The colonial state did not need to accommodate, in Scott’s words, the “luxuriant variety of customary land tenure”
in its efforts to standardize and centralize.35 Instead, it deployed territorial
strategies to empty spaces of indigenous tenure. Its sovereignty established
and Native title ceded or ignored (as was the case in British Columbia), the
colonial state could then refill the space with its land grants.36
In colonies of the British Crown, the recipients of a Crown grant received what had become the ubiquitous form of property – a fee-simple
interest in free and common socage, the largest bundle of property rights
known in English law.37 But whatever its particular form, settlers acquired
land through Crown grants of standardized bundles of rights. The effect
was to bury a prior indigenous legal order, part of a much larger cultural
assault that relegated Native peoples to the margins of settler society.38 As
anthropologist John Comaroff suggests, “it was by appeal to a specifically
legal sensibility that the geography of colonies was mapped, transforming
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the land of others – typically seen by Europeans as wilderness before it was
invested with their gaze – into territory and real estate; a process that made
spaces into places to be possessed, ruled, improved, protected.”39 The idea
of ownership – of private property – lay at the core of this sensibility.
The rights to private property, distributed and backed by the colonial
state, conferred power on their holders who, by erecting a fence or otherwise enforcing a property line, gave local effect to the generalized act of
dispossession inherent in the colonial encounter.40 Private property was a
form of state-delegated sovereignty over fixed parcels of land.41 And given
the virtues attached to private property in the heyday of mid- and latenineteenth-century laissez-faire liberalism – for utilitarian philosopher
Jeremy Bentham, the division of the English commons into private property was “one of the greatest and best understood improvements” – the
extension of private property was itself a justification for imperial control.42
The apogee of laissez-faire liberalism and of European colonial expansion
coincided.
Indian reserves fit within this framework, although the delegation of
sovereignty was incomplete. In British Columbia, as in the rest of Canada,
the federal government held title to reserved land in trust for the Indian
band to which it had been allotted. Together with the Indian Act of 1876,
this arrangement was intended to facilitate the management of Native
peoples and their integration into immigrant Canadian society.43 Nonetheless, each band held the right of exclusive possession to its reserve land.
Within the reserve, the band might distribute rights on the basis of hereditary entitlements, but this was difficult because small reserves excluded
most of each band’s traditional territory. Moreover, the state encouraged
systems of property within reserves that mimicked the regime of fee simple
beyond. Individual band members could apply for certificates of possession that established their right to defined parcels of reserve land.44 Beyond
the reserves, Native purchase or pre-emption of Crown lands became virtually impossible.45 In terms of their capacity to hold property in land, the
law confined Indians in British Columbia to their reserves, but the reserves
were to belong to them exclusively.
Fisheries
The efforts to establish and consolidate the sovereignty of colonial states
did not end at the foreshore. In colonies with a coastline or inland waterways, particularly those with valuable fisheries or strategic navigation routes,
the colonial project included efforts to extend control over water and the
resources within it.
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The extension of state sovereignty over maritime territory proceeded
incrementally. The consensus in the international community in the nineteenth and for much of the twentieth century was that state sovereignty
over adjacent seas extended three miles from the shoreline. This distance,
suggested by the Dutch legal scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek in the
early eighteenth century, was a compromise between those, such as legal
theorist Hugo Grotius, who advocated the complete freedom of the seas,
and others, such as English scholar John Selden, who argued that states
were capable of extending their dominion and establishing property interests in the high seas. Bynkershoek posited that possession might “be regarded as extending just as far as it can be held in subjection to the
mainland,” and that this extended “as far as cannon will carry,” a distance
understood in the early eighteenth century to be approximately one league
or three miles.46
This relatively small maritime belt of state sovereignty coincided with
prevailing assumptions, held into the twentieth century, about the limitlessness of the ocean and the inexhaustibility of its resources. Beyond the
three-mile limit, mare liberum (freedom of the seas) prevailed. In the words
of Grotius, “the sea can in no way become the private property of any one,
because nature not only allows but enjoins its common use.”47 The fish
within the sea, therefore, were “exempt from such private ownership on
account of their susceptibility to universal use; and as they belong to all
they cannot be taken away from all by any one person any more than what
is mine can be taken away from me by you.”48 Beyond the narrow maritime
belt of state sovereignty, fisheries were common property – every state had
the right not to be excluded.49
Within the maritime belt, the legal regime governing fisheries varied with
the state, but the characterization of fisheries as common property was not
easily dislodged. Under the English common law, the right to fish was
understood to belong to the Crown. However, the Crown’s ownership
was subject to the public right to fish. In effect, the Crown held the fisheries in trust for the public. It could not, therefore, claim the exclusive right
to fish or alienate that right to another party. Parliament could modify this
rule, authorizing the Crown to grant exclusive fisheries, but the underlying presumption in the common law was that the Crown’s subjects had a
right not to be excluded from the fisheries – they were common property.50
In non-tidal rivers and lakes, sites of locally important fisheries, the legal
regime followed the forms that applied to land. Under the English common law, rivers and lakes were subject to private ownership. In fact, the law
created a presumption that property interests in land included the bed (the
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solum) of adjacent bodies of water to their midpoint and, therefore, the
exclusive right to fish in those waters. The right to fish could be severed
from the adjacent land, but the common law presumed otherwise. In short,
the exclusive right to fish followed the right to exclusive possession of land.
The courts modified this rule in North America, limiting the extension of
private interests to the foreshore if the body of water adjacent to private
land were navigable. The bed of navigable bodies of water in Canada belonged to the Crown, but it lay within the Crown’s prerogative to alienate
this interest, including the right to fish. In non-tidal waters, therefore, the
extension of state sovereignty and the property regime that consolidated it
emulated the regime on land.51
In tidal waters, sites of the most productive fisheries, the common-law
right not to be excluded was also part of the state’s consolidation of control over its sovereign territory. As with the grant of private property, the
right not to be excluded emanated from the state and was assumed to
supplant whatever preceded it. Even though the legal forms were different
(in fact, they were opposites), the effect of their imposition was to erase
pre-existing legal regimes, thereby confirming the sovereignty and consolidating the control of the colonial state. Except for the limited Indian
food fishing privileges that the Department of Fisheries was prepared to
concede, Native peoples had no prior claim to or property interest in the
fisheries. The fisheries were common property in the sense that all subjects
of the Crown, including Indians, were equally entitled to participate;
everyone had the right not to be excluded.
However, just as Fisheries framed its approach to the Native fisheries in
legal terms, so did its opponents. Native peoples maintained that they owned
the fisheries that were inseparable parts of their communities and, therefore, that they had an Aboriginal right to fish, or that they had rights to fish
that flowed from their Aboriginal title. Although this language is in some
senses new, appearing since Aboriginal rights were entrenched in the Canadian constitution in 1982 and then interpreted in Canadian courts, the
arguments are not. From the beginnings of a European presence in what is
now British Columbia, Native peoples clearly articulated their rights to
land and to resources, none more strongly than the right to their fisheries.
This is reflected in the fisheries clause – the right to “fisheries as formerly”
– in the Douglas Treaties, the fourteen agreements negotiated between
Native peoples on Vancouver Island and the Hudson’s Bay Company as
representative of the British Crown. This treaty right became a touchstone
for those who sought to find space for Native peoples’ fisheries, and I seek
to understand it, in conjunction with the emerging colonial land policy, in
Chapter 1.
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After the Douglas Treaties, the work of the Indian reserve commissioners provides the clearest formal recognition of the importance of the fisheries to Native peoples. In Chapters 2 to 5, I turn to the years between 1876
and 1910 when the Dominion and provincial governments constructed
and then implemented a land policy that was explicitly premised on access
to the fisheries. Chapter 2 covers the work of the Joint Indian Reserve
Commission (1876-78) and that of Gilbert Malcolm Sproat (1878-80) as
the sole commissioner of the Indian Reserve Commission. Sproat’s work is
characterized by careful and thoughtful, if largely futile, attempts to protect the Native fisheries as a means of finding sufficient space for the economies and cultures of Native peoples and immigrants.52 In Chapter 3, I
consider the first year of Sproat’s successor, Peter O’Reilly, the effective
and efficient colonial administrator who, more than any other, would implement the province’s vision of an appropriate Indian land policy in British
Columbia. It is surprising, therefore, that it was the work of this commissioner, inclined to follow instructions and not to advocate, as his predecessor had done, that most provoked the Department of Fisheries. On his first
circuit to the middle Fraser and then to the north coast, O’Reilly granted
exclusive fisheries along the Fraser and Nass rivers as part of or in addition
to the reserves grants, something the department adamantly refused to
recognize on the grounds that the grants violated the common-law doctrine of the public right to fish. In Chapter 4, I explore the public right to
fish, its interpretation in Canadian courts, and its role in shaping Native
peoples’ access to the fisheries. I then return, in Chapter 5, to O’Reilly’s
continuing work as reserve commissioner over nearly two decades, and to
the work of his successor, A.W. Vowell, from 1898 to 1910.
In Chapters 6 and 7, I detour from the narrative of reserve creation to
describe the statute-based regulation of the fishery and its impact on Native fisheries and fishers. It is in Chapter 6 that I revisit Charlie as part of
the construction, in law, of an Indian food fishery. In detaching Native
peoples from their fisheries, the state also defined the terms under which
they could participate as workers in the industrial commercial fishery. As
Alicja Muszynski has argued, Native participation was gendered – men
fished, women worked in the canneries – but it was also racialized.53 By
this she means that the canneries used gender and race as markers to
define and limit who might work, in what capacity, and for what remuneration. Native fishers and cannery workers were not the only ones to
bear these markers. Japanese fishers and Chinese cannery workers were
also the targets of discriminatory attempts to limit or end their participation in the industry. However, in Chapter 7 I focus on the opportunities
for Native fishers in the commercial fleet and on the ways in which the
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allocation of fishing licences worked to preclude full Native participation
in the industry.
I return to the allotment of Indian reserves in Chapter 8 to consider the
importance of the fisheries in the work of the Royal Commission on Indian
Affairs for the Province of British Columbia – the McKenna-McBride Commission – and in the final agreements between the Dominion and province
that wound down the reserve process, fixing the reserve geography of British Columbia that largely remains to this day. Although the commission
was to focus on the land question, the commissioners found themselves
repeatedly drawn by compelling Native testimony to the fisheries, an issue
they could not avoid because the capacity of the reserved land to support
viable livelihoods depended, by design, on access to fish.
These chapters are full of place names and discussions of particular locales. This is in part a function of the fisheries. Fishing is not equally good
everywhere. Prized locations depend upon innumerable physical and ecological variations (in bodies of water, climate, and species of fish), but are
also determined by the prevalent fishing and processing technology and
the social/cultural/legal milieu in which they are used. When the reserve
commissioners sought input from Native peoples, they heard general statements of ownership, but also specific requests for control of particular sites
that were essential parts of local Native economies. More often than not,
these were fishing sites. Reflecting this attention to place, the chapters and
the appendix are full of maps that, I hope, help the reader make sense of
detailed descriptions and identify larger patterns. They also provide a sense
of the spatial theatre that law constructs and operates within.
The focus of this book follows from its sources, principally the records of
the Indian reserve commissions, the Department of Indian Affairs, and the
Department of Marine and Fisheries. These were the authorities most involved in creating Indian reserves and in regulating the fisheries. I spent
time with the provincial Department of Fisheries records, but they appear
infrequently here. In its early years, most of the provincial department’s
efforts went into enhancement projects rather than the regulation and
management of the fisheries. Other material that I have dipped into includes cannery records and private manuscripts from those involved in the
fishing industry. Had the study paid as much attention to management of
land as it does to fish, the files of the provincial Department of Lands
would have been indispensable. But taking this book on its own terms – as
a study of the connections between the colonial land policy and the regulation of the fisheries – what is most glaringly absent are the Native voices.
To the extent that they appear, sympathetic accounts are almost always
filtered through the ear and pen of a missionary or, more commonly by the
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late nineteenth century, an Indian agent or reserve commissioner. More
antagonistic representations of Native claims come from the Fisheries officers. It is primarily through the transcripts of the hearings conducted by
the Royal Commission on Indian Affairs for the Province of British Columbia, 1913-16, that Native voices appear in the written record in their
least mediated form. Here one finds Native voices that eloquently, sadly,
and sometimes angrily denounce the laws and policies of the colonial
state that refused to recognize the legitimacy of their claims and consigned a great many to lives of poverty. One also catches glimpses of a
suppressed legal order struggling to survive the hegemony of the colonial
legal order. Beyond the written records, which can only be the most partial representation of Native views, are the oral histories that reside in
Native communities. Ethno-historian Keith Carlson has skilfully used those
histories and the written record to describe the roots of a continuing conflict between First Nations over the fisheries at Yale.54 In this book I deal
with the laws and policies of the colonial state, their contradictions and
ambiguities, but also their power. To that end, I have attempted to map
officially recognized fishing sites, describe the conflicts that ensue, and
explore the role of law in the process. I have not attempted the larger and
more difficult challenge of mapping the patterns of Native peoples’ use
and control of the fisheries – in effect, the legal geography of the Native
fisheries. Much of that work is being undertaken in First Nations treaty
offices around the province and may well result in the most fundamental
re-mapping of the territory since the reserves were created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.55
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Treaties, Reserves, and Fisheries Law

The west coast of North America entered the imperial orbit of Britain in
the late eighteenth century when maritime explorers mapped the coast,
and merchants followed to trade with Native peoples for sea otter pelts.
The coastal trade was vigorous, but seasonal and short lived. In the early
nineteenth century, other traders arrived from the east, linking the territory overland to Hudson’s Bay, the Red River Settlement, and Montreal,
and to markets around the Pacific. Trading posts became the first nonNative settlements in the western cordillera. Personnel rotated through
the posts, but the trading companies – until 1821 the North West Company and then the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) – remained, their corporate presence a constant despite the comings and goings of individual
traders and workers. Native peoples responded to these new sources of
wealth and power by, in some cases, reorganizing their economies to take
advantage of the window into world markets that the trading companies
provided or, in other cases, resisting and retreating. In either event, Native
peoples continued to live in territories they still largely controlled. Apart
from the sites of their forts, gardens, a few farms, and the temporary spaces
that their workers occupied as they moved between posts, the trading companies did not seek to control land.1
It was not until 1849, after the Oregon Treaty of 1846 extended the
forty-ninth parallel as the boundary between American and British interests in North America to the Pacific, that the HBC assumed responsibility
for Vancouver Island as a proprietary colony of the British Crown with a
mandate to encourage settlement.2 Settlers, primarily of British descent,
and many of them retired HBC employees, trickled into this distant corner
of Empire until 1858, when, with the discovery of gold in the Fraser Canyon, thousands of miners flooded north from the gold fields in California
to Victoria, stopping briefly for supplies before crossing to the Fraser River
on the mainland. To forestall a possible annexation of the territory by the
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United States, and to establish British law, if only symbolically, over a wellarmed and defiant collection of miners, the Colonial Office created the
mainland colony of British Columbia that same year. It also sent a detachment from the Royal Engineers, 220 soldiers strong, that for the next five
years provided a land-based military presence to complement the gunboats
of the Royal Navy and that began building a colonial infrastructure, including roads, bridges, townsite plans, and land surveys. The island and
mainland colonies joined in 1866 and entered the Canadian confederation
in 1871.3
The mid-nineteenth-century transition in British interest in the western
cordillera – from trading country to settlement frontier – also marked the
beginnings of a fundamental transition in relations with Native peoples.
Associates in the diversified trading enterprise that had emerged in the first
half of the nineteenth century, Native peoples now became obstacles in the
way of settlement and progress.4 During the initial and brutal encounter of
miners and Natives in the Fraser Canyon in 1858, miners shot their way in
and used their superior firepower to hold their positions.5 Less suddenly,
but ultimately with greater implications for the lives of most Native peoples
in the two colonies, the fixity of an agrarian economy and accompanying
notions of private property clashed with the seasonal patterns of Native
land use that revolved around winter villages, fishing and hunting grounds,
plant harvesting territories, and spiritual sites. The appearance of a settler
fence to satisfy the requirement under a pre-emption claim to “improve”
the land, to keep foraging animals out of a vegetable garden, or simply to
establish a tangible boundary enclosing private land, was the locally encountered evidence of a new and imposed system of private property. Land
inside the fence had become the exclusive possession of its owner.6
Supporting the fence and the right to exclusive possession that it announced were cadastral surveys, maps, land registries, courts, police, and
the military – the technologies and institutions deployed by the state to
extend and confirm its power by defending the inviolability of the rights it
had granted. Indeed, one of the principal functions of the colonial state
was to protect these new property lines, securing private property and creating transferable value for its owner. Geographer Nick Blomley suggests
that the frontier, which marked the spatial limit of the colonial state’s effective control, was distinguishable by the different systems of land tenure
that existed on either side: “Inside the frontier lie secure tenure, fee-simple
ownership, and state-guaranteed rights to property. Outside lie uncertain
and undeveloped entitlements, communal claims, and the absence of state
guarantees to property.”7 Similarly, historian John Weaver describes “borderlands or frontiers as areas where the colonizer’s regime of property rights
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had not been firmly installed, but where newcomers were already marking
out places in anticipation of that condition.”8 Within the colonial state,
life was civilized (propertied); beyond, it was savage (not or insufficiently
propertied).
Houses, gardens, and fences were the markers of possession within English culture, establishing not only individual ownership, but also evidence
of British sovereignty, civilization, and, in relation to Native peoples, superiority. They were the signs, to the culture that produced them, of an
industrious people. The importance of these domestic and mundane acts
of building and planting as symbols of British dominion separated the
British not only from the Native peoples, who lived differently in the same
territories, but also from other European colonial powers in the western
hemisphere who, Patricia Seed argues, based their claims to sovereignty
on other ceremonies of possession.9 This assertion of sovereignty and the
regime of property that accompanied it displaced prior ways of living on
the land. Blomley emphasizes the violence that underscored the dismembering of a locally owned and regulated commons, the creation of private
property and its right of exclusive possession pushing out those who once
had access.10
As the Crown began to alienate parcels of land to newcomers through
processes of pre-emption (a claim to land that could be perfected once the
land was surveyed, the purchase price paid, and evidence of improvements
confirmed) or purchase, it also allotted Indian reserves. Beginning with
the creation of the Colony of Vancouver Island in 1849, these processes,
which divided land into Indian reserves and land available for the exclusive
possession of immigrants, continued in tandem for seventy-five years, the
allotment of reserves generally following a few years behind increased settler interest in a region, until 1924, when the Dominion and provincial
government agreed on what they regarded as the final reserve geography
of British Columbia. With the exception of the Douglas Treaties on
Vancouver Island and Treaty 8 in the northeast, the issue of Native title
and the need to seek agreement with Native peoples over the shared use of
space was ignored.
In this chapter, I begin a parallel narrative of the conflict over fish, focusing on the process of reserve allotments and the introduction of AngloCanadian fisheries law. It starts with the Douglas Treaties and, more
generally, the nature of Native title and of rights to fish. It then turns to
consider the allotment of reserves in relation to the fisheries. This discussion is relatively brief, a function of the fact that fisheries were not yet a site
of conflict between Natives and newcomers. The inexhaustible abundance
of fish was presumed and, although some imagined the resource could be

D-harris2.p65

20

4/16/2008, 3:46 PM

Treaties, Reserves, and Fisheries Law 21

a future source of great wealth, there was little non-Native interest. That
was not the case in the Great Lakes fisheries, already the site of protracted
conflict between Native and non-Native fishers and the colonial government in Upper Canada and then Canada West. It was this history of conflict that British Columbia acquired when it joined the Canadian
confederation in 1871 and ceded jurisdiction over fisheries to the Dominion. The chapter concludes with a brief foray into that history.
Treaty and Native Rights to Fish
The agreements known as the Douglas Treaties are fourteen land purchases
made by James Douglas in his capacity as the Hudson’s Bay Company’s
chief trader, and then governor of the colony of Vancouver Island, between
1850 and 1854. The land, purchased from Native peoples on Vancouver
Island, covered a small fraction of the island, including the area around
Victoria, the Saanich Peninsula, the future townsite of Nanaimo midway
up the island, and an area near Fort Rupert at its northeastern end (Figure
1.1). The treaties loom over the process of reserve allotments in British
Columbia, marking the beginning of an unfinished project to treat with
Native peoples and serving as a reminder of the suppressed yet outstanding
question of Native title.
Much has been written about why Douglas undertook these purchases
on Vancouver Island and why he did not continue them. It seems that
recognition of a legal requirement to extinguish Native title was an important part of his motivation for beginning the process, but ebbing enthusiasm for treaties in the Colonial Office in London reduced the incentive to
continue the process when other interests intervened. Cole Harris has
emphasized Douglas’s pragmatism, born of a lifetime in the fur trade, suggesting that he was less concerned about theories of Indian land policy and
even of the law of Native title than about finding workable solutions for
Native and European coexistence.11 Legal historians Hamar Foster and Alan
Grove suggest that the decision of an Oregon court to deny the existence
of Native title, discredited in Oregon and Washington but picked up in
Alaska, may also have influenced Douglas and his successor in the formation of colonial land policy, Commissioner of Lands Joseph Trutch, who
was openly hostile to the idea of Native title.12
The legal standing of Native title may have been fragile enough in the
mid-nineteenth century that colonial authorities were prepared to ignore
it, but there was less doubt about the existence of specific Native rights,
particularly rights to hunt and fish. Moreover, protecting these rights, on
which Native economies depended, fit Douglas’s pragmatism. Native
peoples’ hunting could coexist with non-Native ownership, if not use and
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Figure 1.1 Boundaries of the Douglas Treaties, 1850-54. The treaty process
did not continue beyond 1854, leaving the issue of Native title unresolved on the
rest of Vancouver Island and throughout most of the mainland colony of British
Columbia. | Source: The treaty boundaries were adapted from the information available
in the Government of Canada’s Directory of Federal Real Property (http://www.tbssct.
gc.ca/dfrp-rbif/treaty-traite.asp?Language=EN).
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occupation, of the land, and the fishery could be secured without much
impact on the land available for incoming settlers. In anticipation of the
treaties, Douglas wrote to the HBC that he “would strongly recommend,
equally as a matter of justice, and from regard to the future peace of the
colony, that the Indians Fishere’s [sic], Village Sitis [sic] and Fields, should
be reserved for their benifit [sic] and fully secured to them by law.”13 HBC
secretary Archibald Barclay, in setting out the Company’s obligations and
policy towards Native peoples on Vancouver Island, instructed Douglas
that the “right of fishing and hunting will be continued to them.”14
On the basis of these instructions, Douglas entered negotiations with
the tribes on southern Vancouver Island. After minimal discussions (of which
no minutes were kept), Douglas asked the chiefs to place X’s on blank
sheets of paper. Following the conclusion of the first nine agreements at
Fort Victoria between 29 April and 1 May 1850, Douglas wrote to the
HBC to explain his understanding of what had transpired: “I informed the
natives that they would not be disturbed in the possession of their Village
sites and enclosed fields, which are of small extent, and that they were at
liberty to hunt over unoccupied lands, and to carry on their fisheries with the
same freedom as when they were the sole occupants of the country.”15 He forwarded the “signatures” of the chiefs and asked that the HBC supply the
proper conveyancing instrument to which the signatures could be attached.
Several months later, Barclay replied, approving the agreements and sending a template purchase agreement, based on New Zealand precedents,
that would become the text of the Douglas Treaties.16 The first paragraph
described the lands that were covered by the treaty; the second described
the terms:
The condition of or understanding of this sale is this, that our [Indian] village sites
and enclosed fields are to be kept for our own use, for the use of our children, and
for those who may follow after us; and the land shall be properly surveyed, hereafter. It is understood, however, that the land itself becomes the entire property of
the white people for ever; it is also understood that we are at liberty to hunt over
the unoccupied lands, and to carry on our fisheries as formerly.17

Although the structure and content of Barclay’s template emulated the
New Zealand deeds, the final clause setting out the hunting and fishing
rights was new. The guarantee that the Indians were to be “at liberty ... to
carry on [their] fisheries as formerly” appears to be an abbreviated version
of the agreement as described by Douglas several months earlier: “They
were at liberty ... to carry on their fisheries with the same freedom as when
they were the sole occupants of the country.”
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Given these events, the treaties are best understood as oral agreements.
The written text, based on imperial precedent, drafted by someone not
present at the negotiations, and supplied months afterward, should be considered as evidence of the terms of those agreements, not as the agreements themselves. As evidence, the written text probably provides reasonable
indication of what the HBC thought it needed to do and how Douglas
understood the treaties. The anthropologist Wilson Duff considered the
text to be “the white man’s conception (or at least his rationalization) of
the situation as it was and of the transaction that took place.”18 It provides
little or highly qualified evidence, at best, of how the Native participants
understood the agreements.19
Even the terms of the written text are not self-evident.20 It is clear, however, that “fisheries” were an important part of the agreement. A “fishery”
or its plural, “fisheries,” refers not only to the act of fishing but also to the
places where it occurs. In reserving “fisheries,” therefore, the Douglas Treaties reserved the right to fish at the places where Native people fished.
Several years after concluding the last of the treaties, Douglas informed the
Vancouver Island House of Assembly, in similarly broad terms, that Native
peoples “were to be protected in their original right of fishing on the coast
and in the bays of the Colony.”21 In describing the fishing right as “original,” Douglas meant that it preceded the British assertion of sovereignty,
not that it was otherwise constrained.
In short, the Douglas Treaties provided broad protection for Native fisheries. In the 1850s, the boundaries of the right did not need to be carefully
drawn. An abundance of fish was presumed, and there was little non-Native
interest in prosecuting a fishery. However, the fisheries were certainly not
an afterthought. The HBC had deployed some of its workers to the fisheries
of the Fraser River in the 1840s but had realized that it was more efficient
and effective to purchase fish from Native fishers. These fish, which the
HBC barrelled and salted on the Fraser beginning in the 1820s, had become one of its principal exports from the Pacific coast of North America.22
Thus, the treaties were concluded in a context of well-established and ongoing commercial activity in the fishery involving the HBC and Native
peoples. Douglas believed that this would continue, and he hoped that it
would grow. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that the right to “fisheries as
formerly” did not include a commercial aspect, such as the right to sell fish
to commercial trading companies. Furthermore, there is no indication that
Douglas thought that the treaty protected only a food fishery. In fact, viewing “Indian food fishing” as a separate category was not yet a way of thinking about Native fishing in British Columbia. The concept, established in
Canadian fisheries regulations in the late nineteenth century, would become
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an important part of fisheries management and an effective way to diminish Native peoples’ access to the fish, but it was not part of the framework
in which the treaties were negotiated.23
However, Douglas certainly did not intend to preclude non-Native participation. He believed that the long-term prosperity of the colony depended on attracting immigrants, and the fisheries would be one of the
principal draws for those newcomers. The HBC had sought control of the
fisheries as part of the Crown grant of Vancouver Island, but the Crown
withdrew this provision, which had appeared in an early draft, in the midst
of public disapprobation of the HBC in London.24 As a result, the HBC
prospectus for the colonization of Vancouver Island informed prospective
settlers that “every freeholder shall enjoy the right of fishing all sorts of fish in
the seas, bays, and inlets of, or surrounding, the said Island.”25 In tidal
waters, then, the prospectus asserted the right of the landowning public to
fish as, indeed, the common-law doctrine of the public right to fish established for the public at large.
It was not until the creation and expansion of the industrial commercial
fishery in the 1870s that Native rights to fish began to be challenged and
that the meaning of the fisheries clause in the Douglas Treaties began to
matter – and to be forgotten or ignored. In May 1878, complaints that the
Esquimalt people were wasting fish roe were registered in the provincial
legislature. Indian Reserve Commissioner Gilbert Malcolm Sproat noted
that the allegations, if true, were to be regretted, but that the Esquimalt
were a party to one of the Douglas Treaties, which protected their right to
fish, and therefore the government could not interfere.26 A settler’s preemption at the mouth of the Goldstream River in Saanich Inlet was another source of concern because, as Sproat pointed out, it would interfere
with the treaty fishing rights of several different bands that occupied the
location seasonally.27 Sproat, at least, interpreted the treaty right broadly.
What about Native peoples who were not party to the Douglas Treaties?
The language of the fisheries clause – that Native people were “at liberty ...
to carry on ... fisheries as formerly” – suggests that the treaties should not
be understood as creating or granting a right to fish. Instead, the clause
turned an existing practice and right into a treaty right. Native peoples in
the rest of the province did not have this treaty right, but they still had
rights that pre-existed the treaties. In 1860, Douglas wrote to the Colonial
Office to describe a series of meetings with Native peoples in the interior
of the mainland colony. Douglas explained that he had told the people
gathered at Lillooet that “they might freely exercise and enjoy the rights
of fishing the Lakes and Rivers, and of hunting over all unoccupied Crown
Lands in the Colony.”28 Although clearly echoing the language in the
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treaties, the characterization of the rights to hunt and fish was somewhat
narrower. The right to hunt extended only to “unoccupied Crown lands”
and, without any reference to prior rights or to “fisheries as formerly,” the
promise that “they might freely exercise and enjoy the rights of fishing”
was little more than what Douglas would have told a non-Native audience.
The end of the treaties marked the end of Douglas’s formal recognition of
Native title, and perhaps, by 1860, he was being more circumspect in his
recognition of rights to hunt and fish as well.
However, the fishing rights in the Douglas Treaties remained a powerful
presence in the discussion of fishing rights beyond the borders of the treaties. Sproat was involved again in 1878 when the location of a sawmill
became an issue because the running of logs down the Cowichan River to
the mill threatened to destroy the Cowichan’s weir fishery. He argued that
the Cowichan, although not party to a treaty, had a similar right, by virtue
of their long use of the river, to continue fishing as formerly. The government, he thought, should provide compensation and obtain the Cowichan’s
consent before the mill owner could float logs down the river.29 The following year, A.C. Anderson, the senior Department of Marine and Fisheries (Fisheries) official in British Columbia and former member of the Joint
Indian Reserve Commission, referred the minister of Fisheries to the Douglas Treaties, indicating his understanding that Native peoples across the
province, not just the treaty Indians, had a right to continue their fisheries.30 Four decades later, in 1918, William Sloan, the provincial commissioner of Fisheries, expressed the view that Native peoples had rights to
their fisheries, that the fisheries clause in the Douglas Treaties was evidence
of this, and that if Native fisheries were to be closed, even for conservation
purposes, then the fishers should be compensated. As the devastating impact of the 1914 rock slide at Hells Gate on the Fraser River sockeye became apparent, he wrote:
The runs of salmon to the spawning-beds of the Fraser have become so alarmingly
attenuated that drastic measures will have to be taken to restore the runs. The
measures to be taken must not only include the secession of all fishing in tidal limits
for a period of years, but must be made to include all fishing above tidal limits by
Indians for all time, notwithstanding that they have both a natural and a treaty right
to take such salmon as they desire for food so long as they confine themselves to the
gear originally used by them ...
The right of the Indians to take salmon is unquestioned, but the number of salmon
they can now catch is so small as to be of little benefit to them. Owing to the fact
that most of the Indians now grow the bulk of the food they use and are no longer
dependent on salmon, and that drastic measures must be taken to restore the salmon
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of the Fraser, the Government should step in and acquire by purchase the Indians’
right to take fish above the commercial boundaries. It is suggested that the Indians,
if deliberately approached, would dispose of their fishing rights to the Government, and that the Government is fully warranted in entering upon negotiations to
acquire those rights. The sooner the better.31

This understanding was certainly not unanimous. The Department of
Fisheries considered Native fishing privileges – it did not consider them as
rights – were derived from the Crown at its pleasure. More particularly,
they derived, under legislation, from the department itself. This view came
to predominate in the 1880s and 1890s, although the Department of
Indian Affairs was never entirely comfortable with it, and there were always
voices within government, such as Sproat’s and, later, Sloan’s, which insisted that Native fishing rights needed to be recognized and pointed to
the Douglas Treaties as evidence.32 Native voices were unequivocal, if seldom heard in the halls of the Department of Fisheries in Ottawa. Their
fisheries were not a privilege, nor were they derived from Crown grant.
They had rights to fish – rights that originated in their laws and legal traditions – that they had never surrendered.33
Fisheries and Colonial Land Policy
Cole Harris and Lillian Ford document the creation of 140 reserves on
Vancouver Island and in the mainland colony of British Columbia between
1849 and 1871.34 Of the twenty-eight reserves allotted on Vancouver Island before Confederation, most were Douglas Treaty reserves. Harris describes these allotments as forming the beginnings of a Native land policy
that “focused on small reserves tucked within the cadastral survey of colonial settlement ... It was an imposed policy, one that took into some account the location of occupied winter villages, but that shows no evidence
of meaningful consultation with Native people. It did provide, however,
some minimal space for Native peoples within their traditional territories, a
pattern that would endure.”35 The non-treaty reserves on Vancouver Island, most of which were between Duncan and Nanaimo, where growing
non-Native settlement was causing considerable unrest among the Cowichan
and neighbouring groups, followed a similar pattern.36
Although reserves were small, Native people were not confined to them.
The hunting and fishing clause in the treaties protected their rights to
continue these activities in traditional territories beyond the reserves, and
it would have been assumed that these terms applied to the non-treaty
groups as well. Probably because of these general guarantees in the treaties
and because there was scant non-Native interest in the fisheries, there is
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little suggestion in the official record that the pre-Confederation reserves
on Vancouver Island were allotted to secure access to fish, or that officials
attempted to justify the small reserves on the grounds that fishing peoples
did not need large land bases. That justification would come later. The
location of the principal fisheries for some of these groups may also have
been a factor reducing the likelihood of explicit connections between reserves and fisheries. The Songhees, whose reserves were in and around
Victoria, fished sockeye with reef nets in the San Juan Islands. Their two
reserves on Discovery Island and the Chatham Islands, located just off the
southern tip of Vancouver Island, may well have been set aside as departure
points for those fisheries across Haro Strait, but the fisheries themselves
were in United States waters (Figure 1.2).37 Although its effect was not
immediately felt, the international boundary, which severed Native territories, would cause great hardship.38 Dave Elliot Sr., a member of the Saanich,
who also had fishing grounds across Haro Strait, recounted the impact of
the border on his people and their access to the fisheries:
We had all those salmon runs and that beautiful way of fishing [reef nets]. When
they divided up the country we lost most of our territory. It is now in the State of
Washington. They said we would be able to go back and forth when they laid down
the boundary, they said it wouldn’t make any difference to the Indians. They said
that it wouldn’t affect us Indians.
They didn’t keep that promise very long; Washington made laws over the Federal laws, British Columbia made laws over those Federal laws too, and pretty soon
we weren’t able to go there and fish. Some of our people were arrested for going
over there. That’s what happened to our fishery. That’s why we’re not fishing right
now today. The Indians are fishing in Washington using our way of fishing. We lost
our fishery, and our fishing grounds.39

Other groups along the east shore of Vancouver Island, particularly the
Cowichan, Chemainus, Penelakut, and Halalt, had important summer fisheries on the mainland near the mouth of the Fraser River. They did not
cross an international border to access their fisheries, but government officials did not allot reserves at these summer fishing camps either. This became a problem in the 1870s with the rise of the industrial/commercial
fishery and the growing competition for fish.
On the mainland, there were no treaties between 1858 and 1871, but
Ford and Harris count 112 reserves allotted primarily in the Fraser Valley
and along the Fraser and Thompson river systems. It was here that settler
interest in using Native land, largely for agriculture, mining, and road building, had produced the greatest tension and conflict. The records of exactly
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Figure 1.2 Songhees Indian reserves and fisheries. The reserves on Discovery
Island and the Chatham Islands may well have been intended as points of departure for the reef-net fisheries on San Juan Island. However, the international
boundary, established by the Oregon Treaty in 1846, would eventually prevent
Songhees’ access to those fisheries. | Source: The locations of the camps and reef-net
sites are from John Lutz, “Work, Wages and Welfare in Aboriginal-Non-Aboriginal Relations, British Columbia, 1849-1970” (PhD diss., Department of History, University of
Ottawa, 1994), 149, 224.

what was allotted in these non-treaty reserves are poor, not only because
they do not survive, but also because the government did not record its
work carefully. In some cases there were multiple and inaccurate surveys; in
other cases there were no surveys at all. The problem of determining reserve allotments is compounded by the significant change in land policy
that followed Governor Douglas’s retirement in 1864. In comparison to
what would follow, the Douglas reserves on the mainland were generous
and, when combined with land laws that allowed Natives to acquire other
land on the same terms as immigrants, seemed to provide space for Native
people to participate as full members in the colonial economy. At least that
was Douglas’s goal. The new commissioner of Lands and Works, Joseph
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Trutch, who replaced Douglas as the principal architect of a Native land
policy, set about reducing the size of many of the existing reserves and
erecting legal boundaries to limit Native acquisition of other land. His aim,
shared by many in the colonial society, was to create as much space as
possible for an incoming settler society. It was Douglas’s views that were
the more unusual.40
The reserves allotted under Trutch’s tenure were small, to amount to no
more than ten acres per family. This was insufficient to support viable agricultural economies, but agriculture was not the focal point of most Native
economies in the province. The fisheries were far more important, and
many of these small reserves were situated at important fishing sites. This is
particularly true of the reserves allotted to the Stó:lō and Nlha7kapmx
along the Fraser River. Fish, primarily salmon, were the principal source of
sustenance and wealth for these communities, and the placement and distribution of reserves almost exclusively along the river reflects that connection. The fishery at Yale at the start of the Fraser Canyon, for example, was
particularly productive, attracting thousands of fishers from downriver in
July and August. Upriver there were a great many locally important fishing
sites, some of which were included within the reserves. In the flood plain
of the Fraser Valley, most of the reserves would have been allotted for some
combination of agricultural and fishing purposes. It was at Kamloops and
in the Okanagan where the connection between the pre-Confederation
reserves and the fisheries was perhaps most tenuous. Fish were still an important part of local economies, but the large reserves, subsequently reduced, were intended to support a farming and ranching economy.
The colonial government after Douglas would likely have reduced Native access to fish, just as it reduced reserves, had fisheries been an important part of the colonial economy. They would become so, but only after
British Columbia joined Canada and ceded jurisdiction over fisheries to
the Dominion. Until then, the fisheries did not receive much attention.
Reflecting both a broadly held perception in Britain that seacoast fisheries
were best managed by the market’s invisible hand and the relative lack of
importance of the fishery to the colonial economy in British Columbia, the
local colonial government hardly intervened in the fishery. The House of
Assembly on Vancouver Island passed one act in 1862 that contained a
clause purporting to regulate fishing in Victoria’s inner harbour and the
colony’s lakes, but no one seems to have paid much attention to it and, as
I have argued elsewhere, it does not seem to have been directed at Native
fishers.41 For those who might have been concerned about a lack of protection for Native fisheries, the fisheries clause in the Douglas Treaties and a
somewhat weaker, although nonetheless prevalent, sense of Native fishing
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rights would probably have seemed enough. The experience of Native
peoples around the Great Lakes suggested otherwise.
Fisheries Law and Policy in Pre-Confederation Canada
The colonies of Vancouver Island and British Columbia had relatively little
contact with the Province of Canada until the negotiations that would lead
British Columbia into the Canadian confederation in 1871. Colonial officials had much more to do with HBC headquarters and the Colonial Office, both of which were based in London, than they did with the eastern
colonies. Indeed, it was through the Colonial Office that Douglas received
copies of the fisheries legislation from the Province of Canada in the early
1860s.42 As a result of these tenuous connections, Indian land policy and
fisheries regulation in the east had little impact in British Columbia until
after Confederation. However, when British Columbia joined Canada, ceding jurisdiction over “Seacoast and Inland Fisheries” and “Indians and Lands
Reserved for Indians” to the Dominion government, it received Dominion fisheries law as well as the existing bureaucracies for managing fish and
the lives of Native peoples.43
The province’s refusal to recognize Native title, and its insistence that its
land policy continue after British Columbia joined Canada in 1871, provoked considerable debate between the Dominion and the province. The
introduction of Dominion fisheries law and a bureaucracy to manage the
fishery proved much less contentious. In the mid-1870s, the operators of
the industrial commercial fishery at the mouth of the Fraser River began
clamouring for state regulation of the salmon fishery, at least to limit competition. As a result, the Dominion introduced the Fisheries Act of 1868 to
British Columbia in 187744 and the first set of regulations for the province
in 1878.45 Fisheries did little in the 1870s to enforce these laws, and Native
fishers were informally exempted from the regulations, but the beginnings
of the legal framework that would govern the fishery were in place. This
legal framework, and the bureaucracy that the Dominion established to
enforce it, had emerged out of a history of conflict with Native fishers in
the Great Lakes. Many of the important figures in the Fisheries Branch of
the Department of Marine and Fisheries, including the commissioner of
Fisheries, W.F. Whitcher, had cut their teeth on the conflicts that ensued
when long-established Native fisheries, most of them protected under treaty,
were reallocated to non-Native commercial and sport fishers. It was this
legacy of conflict that British Columbia acquired when the Dominion assumed responsibility for the fisheries.
Crown policy on the Great Lakes had not always been thus. In the early
nineteenth century, as the non-Native population spread north and west
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from Lake Ontario, the British signed a series of land cession treaties with
the Ojibwa. Historian Michael Thoms, drawing on oral histories and historical records, argues that these treaties were intended to allow for the
political, economic, and ecological coexistence of the Ojibwa and the newcomers. The Ojibwa reserved the wetlands, sites of their most productive
fisheries, and ceded the arable uplands to the newcomers to support their
agrarian-based economy. Although the written texts of most of these early
treaties do not mention fish, the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada
followed every treaty in the early nineteenth century with legislation prohibiting non-Native access to the productive fisheries at the mouths of the
rivers flowing into Lake Ontario. These fisheries acts, Thoms suggests, are
evidence of the colonial state fulfilling its obligations, under the treaties, to
protect the Ojibwa’s exclusive fisheries by prohibiting non-Native access at
the times and places where the Ojibwa fished. He finds the antecedents of
this legislation in English fisheries acts that set aside the inland fishery for
the landed gentry. The Upper Canadian legislation of the early nineteenth
century, he concludes, was similarly intended to preserve the fisheries for a
particular group – the Ojibwa.46
As non-Native interest in the fisheries grew, however, so did incursions
into Ojibwa fishing grounds. Despite well-documented Native protests,
growing more vigorous in the 1830s, that the existing laws were inadequate
and insufficiently enforced to protect the Ojibwa fisheries, government
officials did little to exclude non-Native fishers. In fact, the colonial government began issuing commercial fishing licences to non-Native fishers in
waters that the Ojibwa had thought were reserved, under treaty, exclusively to them. In some cases the government required the licensee to secure permission from and compensate the Ojibwa for the use of their fishing
grounds, but these stipulations were seldom enforced. Historian Victor
Lytwyn has chronicled the growing conflict over fisheries around Manitoulin
Island and the Saugeen Peninsula on Lake Huron in the mid-nineteenth
century. This conflict between Ojibwa fishers, non-Native licence holders,
and government officials would include the alleged murder of Fisheries
Overseer William Gibbard in 1863.47 Legal scholar Peggy Blair finds the
roots of this conflict in a fundamental transition in government policy in
the mid-nineteenth century, perhaps best evidenced by the widely circulated 1845 opinion of Attorney General W.H. Draper: “I have the honor
to report my opinion, that the right to fish in public navigable waters in
Her Majesty’s dominions is a common public right – not a regal franchise
– and I do not understand any claim the Indians can have to its exclusive
enjoyment.”48 In this view, rights to exclusive fisheries derived from the
parliament; Native rights to exclusive fisheries that preceded the Crown’s
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assertion of sovereignty, even if recognized by the Crown in treaties, were
unenforceable at law unless approved by parliament.49 The accuracy of this
opinion has been strongly challenged in recent work,50 but even if it were
an accurate summation of the law, Thoms argues that parliament gave its
imprimatur to the exclusive Ojibwa fisheries in the legislation that followed
the treaties.51
Government officials had either forgotten or dismissed the earlier treaty
promises when, in 1857, the Legislative Assembly for the Province of Canada
passed its first comprehensive fishing legislation, at the same time rescinding the earlier acts that had been intended, at least initially, to protect Ojibwa
fishing.52 The new Fishery Act, substantially revised (and renamed Fisheries
Act) in 1858, offered commercial fishers greater security of tenure to fishing grounds through Crown-issued licences and leases.53 It also set aside
particular fish for the benefit of sport fishers, who, Thoms suggests, were
the most important lobby group behind the new legislation. The new acts
did not mention or protect the Ojibwa treaty rights to fish. Indeed, Ojibwa
fisheries in Lake Huron were soon overwhelmed by non-Native commercial operators brandishing Crown-granted licences and leases for shorebased seine-net fisheries. At the behest of sport fishers, Fisheries officers
targeted Ojibwa fishing in the smaller lakes and rivers as well, imposing
close seasons and gear restrictions that accommodated sport fishers’ interests and, in effect, setting aside the fisheries for them. In 1865, the government added a section to the Fisheries Act that allowed officials to permit
Indian food fishing with otherwise prohibited technology at times and in
locations that were closed to other fishers.54 Exercised at the discretion of
the local Fisheries officers, these food fishing privileges allowed restricted
opportunities for Native fishers to operate in territories that they had never
ceded under treaty, or in which they thought they had treaty rights to
exclusive fisheries. In short, it was this institutional history of conflict over
fish, and the substantial marginalization of the Native fishery, that British
Columbia inherited when the Department of Fisheries assumed control of
the Pacific coast fisheries in the mid 1870s.
Conclusion
When, in 1871, British Columbia joined the Canadian confederation, the
negotiated terms of union gave the Dominion government jurisdiction
over both fisheries and Indians, placing responsibility for them in the departments of Fisheries and Indian Affairs. The terms of union also required
the Dominion to pursue as liberal a policy towards Indians as had the former
colony.55 The Conservative government of John A. Macdonald was soon to
realize, however, that the colonial policy in British Columbia had become
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neither liberal nor generous, and that the province refused to recognize
Native title or the need to extinguish it through treaty. The colonial land
policy, as it had evolved under Joseph Trutch, of small, scattered reserves
that provided some minimal protection for Native villages and resource
procurement sites, became the land policy in the province of British Columbia. This policy would be tempered somewhat by a Dominion government that sought some additional accommodations but that would not
press the issue of Native title in negotiations with the province or through
the courts. Reserves remained small.
Although the provincial land policy prevailed, it was the Dominion’s
legislation, regulations, and policies that governed the fisheries. Built upon
the common inheritance of the English common law, a Canadian fisheries
regime, which had been overtaken in the mid-nineteenth century by a revisionist understanding of Native treaty rights to fish in the Great Lakes,
arrived in British Columbia. Specific regulations tailored for British Columbia would soon appear, and local fisheries officials would inflect the law
towards local circumstances through its enforcement or, initially, lack of
enforcement. Nonetheless, the essential legal elements and an institutional
history that had been formed by a culture of conflict with Native fishers,
and their dispossession, were now in place in British Columbia.
All but forgotten, or at least ignored by officials within the Department
of Fisheries, was the fisheries provision in the Douglas Treaties. In securing
the right to “fisheries as formerly,” the treaties recognized the fundamental importance of the fisheries to the lives, economies, and cultures of Native peoples on the Pacific coast. Under the treaties, the fisheries were, as
Douglas thought they should be, “fully secured to them by law.” Native
peoples were soon to discover that this was not the case, or that, if it were,
legal protection was inadequate to secure to them their fisheries.
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